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ARGUMENT
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FAIRVIEW APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURTS LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS, NOT FACTUAL FINDINGS MARSHALING OF THE
EVIDENCE WAS NOT REQUIRED OR APPROPRIATE.
Appellee's brief complains that Fairview neglected to marshal the evidence. This claim is

erroneous. When an appellant, such as Fairview, challenges a trial court's Finding of Fact and
wishes the Appellate Court to reverse those findings, marshaling of the evidence is required and
deemed appropriate. To successfully challenge a trial court's "Findings of Fact," on appeal, an
Appellant has the obligation of marshaling the evidence in support of those findings and,
considering that evidence in a light most favorable to the jury, still demonstrating that the
findings lack substantial evidentiary support. In Re Estate of BartelL 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989). To undertake such a task as marshaling all of the evidence in a case is "rigorous."
Oneida/SLIC v Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse. Inc.. 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah App.
1994). Appellant (hereinafter "Fairview") noted the difficulty of such a task when formulating

1

the decision not to attack the trial court's finding that the Plaintiff (herein after "Appellee") had
been fired Although Fairview disputed this at trial and continues to maintain the belief that
Appellee quit, Fairview refrained from raising this issue on appeal in accordance with the
realization that appealing such a factual finding would probably be a fruitless endeavor Here,
Fairview chose only to appeal the trial court's "Conclusions of Law," asking the appellate court to
answer the questions, what is "clear and substantial public policy," and what is "conduct
furthering such a public policy Ml Both of these inquiries involve questions of law and require
that the Appellate Court make a determination as to whether the trial court correctly applied its
"Findings of Facts" to the legal standards involved State v Pena. 869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah

appellant's brief plainly states that these are the only issues appealed from At pp 10 of
Appellant's brief it states the following
Issue 1. Did the trial court error in finding that Ms Rackley's termination
implicated a clear and substantial public policy?
Standard of Review. This issue involves two separate inquiries The first
a question of law Does a clear and substantial public policy exist which requires
that a nursing home notify a resident when funds come in addressed to them when
the resident has previously signed a release indicating that a relative will be
handling their monies9 The second is a question of fact If a public policy does
exist which would require such action, did the termination of Ms Rackley
implicate this public policy Thus, this issue involves a mixed question of fact
and law which is reviewed with a varying degree of scrutiny depending on the
particular circumstance State v Pena. 869 P 2d 932 (Utah 1994)
Appellant's brief at pp 10, 11
Issue 2. Did the Trial Court error in determining that Fairview terminated
Ms Rackley as "punishment" for conduct furthering a clear and substantial public
policy9
Standard of Review. This issue involves three separate inquiries First, a
question of law Does a clear and substantial public policy exist9 Second, a
question of law, Would Ms Rackley's actions tend to further this public policy
Third, a question of fact Was Ms Rackley fired for this conduct9 Thus, this
issue involves a mixed question of fact and law which is reviewed with a varying
degree of scrutiny depending on the particular circumstances State v Pena. 869
P 2d 932 (Utah 1994)
2

1994) In such a case, marshaling the evidence is neither required or appropriate As noted in
Taylor v Department of Commerce. 1998 WL 54628, *5 (Utah App ), 952 P 2d 1090 (Utah App
1998), 336 Ut Adv Rpts 16 (1998), where the court dismissed the Appellee's claim that
Appellant had failed to marshal the evidence, stating," we think the issue is more accurately
characterized as whether the Division correctly applied the facts it found to the legal standards of
gross negligence and gross incompetence We thus do not reach the Department's claim that
Taylor failed to marshal the evidence "
Although Appellee complains that Fairview failed to marshal the evidence, Appellee's
statement of issues appears to acknowledge that Fairview is in fact appealing from the trial
Court's legal conclusions rather than its findings of fact—to wit, in Appellee's "Statement of
Issues Presented for Review. " at page 2, issue number 3, Appellee sets forth the following
issue
3_ Whether the District Court correctly ruled that Fairview's termination of Ms
Rackley's employment implicated a clear and substantial public policy
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to
be de novo (as purely a question of law) "[AJppellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness '" State v Pena.
869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), "correctness" means "the appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the
law " Id., State v Deli. 861 P 2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993)
At page 3, issue number 4, Appellee also sets forth the following issue
4_ Whether the District Court correctly ruled that Ms Rackley's conduct in
advancing Muriel Mellen's rights constituted conduct furthering clear and substantial
public policy
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to
be de novo (as purely a question of law) "[AJppellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term 'correctness '" State v Pena.
869 P 2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)

3

Accordingly, Appellee appears to concede the point that the questions and determinations that
Appellant appeals from are a legal conclusion In such a case there is no need for Fairview to
marshal and, accordingly, Fairview properly refrained from doing so
II.

ALL OF THE ISSUES APPEALED FROM WERE PRESERVED BY
APPELLANT IN THE TRIAL COURT.
Appellee's brief suggests that the issues appealed from were not preserved in the trial

Court This suggestion is incorrect Fairview appeals from two determinations made by the trial
court Appellant's brief at pp 10, states those issues as "Issue 1. Did the trial court error in
finding that Ms Rackley's termination implicated a clear and substantial public policy," and,
"Issue 2. Did the Trial Court error in determining that Fairview terminated Ms Rackley as
'punishment' for conduct furthering a clear and substantial public policy?" These two legal
questions, which Fairview appeals from, are the very same legal issue briefed prior to trial and
argued throughout the district court action (Defendant and Plaintiffs trial briefs at R000195000232 and R000241-000286) Hence, no single place in the record exists where these appellate
issues were specifically preserved because these issues, listed above, constituted the entire
dispute, which was presented and argued at trial This is not a case where, for example, the
appellant is appealing from an improper ruling on the admissibility of evidence and must show to
the appellate court that an objection to this error was made while the case was before the trial
court Rather, in this case, the appellant is asking the appellate court to correctly rule on the
same legal issues that formulated the entire basis for the trial court action
The issues of whether a "clear and substantial public policy" existed and whether
Appellee was fired for "conduct furthering" said public policy, were briefed prior to the trial,
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were argued in opening (Tr Vol 1 at pp 13-25) and in closing (Tr Vol 5 at pp 1163-1231), and
were the basis for most—if not all—of the testimony given throughout this lengthy and exhaustive
proceeding (See Tr Vol 1-5) As such the entire record evidences a continuing preservation of
the issue as to whether or not a "clear and substantial public policy" existed that was the basis for
Appellee's termination from Fairview Care Centers and whether her phone call to Sharon Mellen
was "conduct furthering" any public policy
III.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF IS DEFICIENT.
Rule 24 (a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a brief shall

contain, "a statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority " Appellee failed to follow this rule for her fifth issue,
which asks this court" 5_ Whether Fairview is judicially estopped from taking positions on
appeal that are directly contrary to those taken during the District Court proceedings," (Appellee
brief at p 3) by failing to set forth the standard of review or supporting authority for this issue
stating only that "Since the District Court was not presented with this issue, this court should
simply review Fairview's positions taken during the trial proceedings and the positions taken on
appeal and determine, as a matter of law, whether Fairview is estopped from taking a contrary
position on appeal" Appellee should be barred from making this estoppel argument because
Appellee improperly presented it in briefing by leaving out both the proper standard of review or
any supporting authority for this proposition As such, this issue should not be considered by the
Court

5

IV.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE.
Appellee raises the technical argument that Appellant's brief does not comply with Rule

24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which addresses what should be included in
an addendum It is true that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were inadvertently not
included in Appellant's addendum However, before burdening the Court with such a highly
technical and immaterial argument, perhaps Appellee should correct the errors in her own brief,
which completely failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
According to Rule 24(a)(2), a brief—including a reply brief— shall contain,"[a] table of contents,
including the contents of the addendum, with pages referenced " A quick look at Appellee's Brief
indicates Appellee's complete failure to comply with this requirement Appellee's technical
argument regarding addendums does not go to the merits of this case and should not be considered
by this court
V.

NO CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY WAS IMPLICATED IN
APPELLEE'S TERMINATION

Funds were delivered to Fairview Care Center for Muriel Mellen (Tr Vol 1 at pp 140,
Tr Vol 3 at pp 570-571) Certain Fairview employees decided to let Sharon Mellen, Muriel
Mellen's daughter-in-law, tell Muriel Mellen that her money had arrived (Tr Vol 1 at 140-141)
Sharon Mellen wanted to explain to Muriel Mellen that some important purchases should be made
with this large sum of money Id_ Sharon Mellen hoped to convince Muriel Mellen that the money
be spent wisely and in Muriel Mellen's best interest (Tr Vol 3 at pp 777, 876, and 879)
Appellee became aware of this situation and called Sharon Mellen to complain of this occurrence
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(Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 580-868) Fairview's general manager, Mr. Peterson, became aware of this
situation after he received an angry phone call from Sharon Mellen (Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 576-578,
580, and 868). Appellee was terminated as a result of her actions and the employees who
temporarily withheld information from Muriel Mellen about her check were both given a verbal
warning and written reprimands for their conduct (Tr. Vol. 3 at pp. 585, 589 and Tr. Vol. 1 at 140141, 114-115)2 In response to this situation, Mr. Peterson instituted an official written company
policy that requires that staff immediately inform residents of all incoming funds. (Tr. Vol. 1 at
pp. 114-115) He did so with the intention that such a situation would not repeat itself Nothing in
Mr. Peterson's actions violated any "clear or substantial" public policy. Fairview did not violate
any laws by their handling of Muriel Mellen's funds. (Tr. Vol. 4 at p. 1075)
In handling this situation as he did, Mr. Peterson acted as a reasonable and prudent
businessperson would. He had the right to protect the integrity and the reputation of his facility
and he did so in a way he believed was appropriate. Nothing was done to prevent residents in the
future from knowing about their funds; in fact, his actions made certain that all future residents
would know about their funds. To punish this general manager and his facility for his actions
would be to put honest business persons on notice that they must second guess their every move
when disciplining employees for fear of expensive litigation. This would not be proper and would
not advance the purpose of the "public policy" exception as articulated in our growing body of
2

Mr. Peterson, Fairview's general manager, continues to maintain that he did not fire
Appellee that day. While he admits that he intended to do so prior to meeting with her, he
maintains that he did not fire her during their meeting. Instead, Mr. Peterson maintains that he
gave Appellee a thorough scolding for her careless acts in upsetting Sharon Mellen, and for her
failure in not approaching either him or another high-positioned administrator with her concern.
Fairview did not appeal from the Court's Factual Findings regarding this point and simply
mentions this here so that the record is clear.
7

case law in this area Fox v MCI Communications Corp . 931 P 2d 857 (Utah 1997), Heslop v
Bank of Utah. 839 P 2d 828 (Utah 1992), Peterson v Browning. 832 P 2d 1280 (Utah 1992),
Hodges v Gibson Prods Co. 811 P 2d 151 (Utah 1991). Berube v Fashion Center. Ltd . 771
P2d 1033 (Utah 1989)
Since the inception of the "public policy" exception, the Utah Supreme Court has been
abundantly clear in its rulings that this exception should be narrowly construed and should not act
to punish the honest businessperson ld_ Adherence to Appellee's position would require this court
to apply this exception liberally and to punish an honest businessman This would be improper
Nothing in the current law suggests that this is a direction the Utah Supreme Court is interested in
heading within this area of the law Id.
In order for a tort action to lie here, the "public policy" claimed must be so "clear and
substantial" with no "ambiguity on" either "point" that the employer clearly has notice of what
type of conduct would be prohibited Retherford v AT&T Communications of Mountain States.
Inc. 844 P 2d 949, 966 n 9 (Utah 1992)3 Retherford tells us that in order to prove this tort, the
3

Retherford v AT&T Communications of Mountain States. Inc . 844 P 2d 949, 966 n 9
(Utah 1992), states as follows
In determining whether a public policy is sufficiently "clear and substantial" to
support a cause of action for discharge in violation of public policy, one must examine
the strength of the policy as well as the extent to which it affects the public as a whole
The very words "clear and substantial" require a lack of ambiguity on both points As
the majority of this court recognized in Peterson, all statements made in a statute are not
expressions of public policy Many statutes merely regulate conduct between private
individuals or " 'impose requirements whose fulfillment does not implicate fundamental
public policy concerns '" Id. at 1282 (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal 3d
654, 254 Cal Rptr 211, 217, 765 P 2d 373, 379 (1988)) [emphasis added]
The following questions are relevant to determining whether a statute embodies a
clear and substantial public policy First, one must ask whether the policy in question is
one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed to the parties only Second, one
must inquire whether the public interest is so strong and the policy so clear and weighty
8

complainant must show that she was discharged "in a manner or for a reason that contravened a
'clear and substantial public policy' of the State of Utah—a public policy rooted in Utah's
Constitution or statutes " Retherford v AT&T Communications of Mountain States. Inc . 844
P 2d 949, 966 n 9 (Utah 1992) Appellee's brief fails to explain how the "public policy" claimed
is either clear or substantial The seven constitutional and statutory requirements listed by the
District court in it's "Findings and Conclusions" evidence no such "clear" public policy as the one
that Appellee claims Fairview violated 4 Nothing in these legal precepts put Fairview on notice
that "public policy" requires that all residents, regardless of the circumstances of the individual
resident and the releases located in the file, must be immediately informed of incoming funds
Further, nothing in these statutes even suggests that a nursing home employee such as Appellee
has a duty to call and confront family members when concerns about patient's funds arise As
stated in Appellant's brief, a Health Program Manager from the Utah Department of Health
Bureau of Medicare-Medicaid, Program Certification and Resident Assessment, was questioned

that we should place the policy beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a bar to
discharge that parties cannot modify, even when freely willing and of equal bargaining
power Since these are the consequences of qualifying a policy as a basis for the tort
action, these considerations should inform the evaluation of the policy itself See id. at
1288 (Zimmerman, J , concurring and dissenting, joined by Hall, C J ), see also Foley,
765 P 2d at 379-80 & n 12 " (emphasis added)
4

The seven provisions which the District Court found to be the basis for a "clear and
substantial" public policy are
Article I, Section I of the Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution
42 U S C §§3058g(a)(3) and (5)
Utah Code Ann §§ 62A-3-201, et seq.
4 2 U S C § 1396 (i) (6)
Utah Admin Code § R432-150-4
4 2 C F R §483 10
9

specifically about Fairview's handling of Muriel Mellen's funds and this witness indicated that
Fairview had not acted improperly in handling Muriel Mellen's funds (Tr Vol 4 at pp 1075,
Appellant Brief at pp 30-31) If this witness, a Utah State health program manager in the area of
nursing home resident's funds does not believe Fairview acted improperly, then certainly,
regardless of whether or not Fairview erred in some way, their error was not a violation of any
"clear and substantial public policy" mandate Appellee's brief asks this Court to disregard this
witness's statements because this witness, "is not the judge and cannot make legal conclusions "
Fairview concedes that this witness is not the judge, but instead is a state employee in a
management position who's job specifically requires her to understand the proper procedure for
the handling of a patient's funds Who better than this witness to enlighten the Court as to what
policies exist in the area of patient's funds in nursing homes It was this witness's position that
Fairview did not act contrary to any policy At a minimum, this testimony indicates there is no
"clear or substantial public policy" requirement that Fairview act differently than it did, and no
tort action lies here
Appellee's brief acknowledges that nothing in the above- mentioned constitutional
provisions and statutes specifically contemplates or prohibits the actions taken by Fairview in this
case (Appellee's brief at pp 22) As such, it is not "clear" how funds should be handled under
circumstances such as the case of Muriel Mellen Nonetheless, Appellee asks this court to punish
Fairview for their actions, as though they had notice that they were prohibited from acting as they
did in this matter Such a suggestion offends basic notions of due process and is contrary to the
case law on point which specifically mandates that the "public policy" exception will not be
allowed absent a showing that the policy involved was both "clear and substantial " Appellee's
10

position, to the contrary, is inconsistent with the case law addressing this issue, Foxv MCI
Communications Corp . 931 P 2d 857 (Utah 1997), Heslop v Bank of Utah. 839 P 2d 828 (Utah
1992), Peterson v Browning. 832 P 2d 1280 (Utah 1992), Hodges v Gibson Prods Co . 811 P 2d
151 (Utah 1991), Berube v Fashion Center. Ltd . 771 P 2d 1033 (Utah 1989), accordingly,
Appellee's position is erroneous and should be disregarded
Appellee's brief suggests thatthe public policy concerns that are "implicated in this case
are clearly evidenced by the testimony of many of the witnesses in this case," (Appellee's Brief at
pp 30-31) suggesting that because two Fairview employees testified that Muriel Mellen had a
right to know of incoming money, that a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule is
then created

This reasoning is strained and erroneous First, these witnesses cannot make legal

conclusions They are not the judge and do not create the laws in the State of Utah with regards to
when the public policy exception will be allowed This is a legal determination left first to the trial
court judge and now to this Court
Second, one of the two employees who testified that Muriel Mellen "had a right to know"
was the same person who briefly withheld from Muriel Mellen the fact that the money had come
in-evidencing her obvious belief that it was appropriate to allow Ms Sharon Mellen an
opportunity to personally inform Muriel Mellen that the check had arrived Appellee
misrepresents her testimony to suggest that this witness believed that she was violating public
policy at the time that she agreed to allow Sharon Mellen to personally inform Muriel Mellen of
the funds The other employee who made this statement was Mr Peterson, who is the same
person responsible for Appellee's termination, and for instituting an official policy at Fairview
that would, in all future cases, require immediate notification to resident's when funds arrived
11

(Tr Vol 1 at pp 114-115) Mr Peterson's decision to institute this internal policy at Fairview,
although commendable, certainly does not create a "public policy" exception to the at-will
employment doctrine of the State of Utah
Mr Peterson, the general manager of Fairview acted as a reasonable, prudent, and honest
businessman would He did not, either as an individual or on behalf of Fairview, violate any
"clear or substantial" public policy of the State of Utah and he should not be punished as if he had
The trial court erred in finding to the contrary and that determination should be put aside
VI.

APPELLEE'S CONDUCT WAS NOT "IN FURTHERANCE OF" PUBLIC
POLICY.

Appellee's brief refers to Muriel Mellen as a "victim" and suggests that Appellee was fired
for informing the "victim" that her check had come in Appellee's claim is completely erroneous
First, Appellee's suggestion improperly characterizes Muriel Mellen's position in life Muriel
Mellen is not a victim, her family and the Fairview facility where she resides have looked out for
her and have cared for her In his oral decision, the trial court judge notes the same
I don't criticize Sharon Mellen Sharon Mellen is not a thief Sharon Mellen did
not steal this money from Muriel Mellen I don't criticize the facility for working with
Sharon Mellen to, I guess, protect Muriel Mellen from her own best desires and interest of
having the money because of all of the other problems that were attendant with Muriel
Mellen

Sharon Mellen is a wonderful daughter-in-law, as far as I'm concerned, if she's
going to support this woman during the time that she didn't get her checks Once again,
12

I'm not critical of Sharon Mellen at all (Trial Court Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1237)
Additionally, while making the suggestion that Muriel Mellen has been victimized,
Appellee's brief conveniently fails to note that at the time Appellee was telling Muriel Mellen,
"the victim," of the arrival of her check, that the check had already been deposited to Muriel
Mellen's own personal account (Tr Vol 3 at 576-577, 695, 867)
Second, Appellee's brief suggest that Appellee's conduct was in furtherance of public
policy because she, Appellee, was fired for telling Muriel Mellen about the money (See
Appellee's brief at pp 33) Nothing in the trial testimony, or the court's oral decision supports this
statement The testimony at trial clearly indicated that Appellee's phone call to Sharon Mellen
was the impetus that led to Fairview's general manager, calling Appellee in for a meeting where
he told her that her employment at Fairview could not continue (Tr Vol 3 at 580-581, 586, 589,
776)
The trial testimony also indicated that although Appellee told Muriel Mellen of the arrival
of her check, Appellee was not the first person to do so, (Tr Vol 3 at p 692) in fact, another
Fairview employee told Muriel Mellen about the check before Appellee did Id_ The trial court's
Oral Decision in this matter clearly expresses the trial court's understanding that Appellee's firing
was caused by her phone call to Sharon Mellen (Trial court Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp
1236-1239) The trial court articulates this while discussing the possible reasons why Appellee
was fired, by stating the following
the ostensible reasons for firing, all of which were not presented by Mr
Peterson, but were mentioned in the January meeting, had all been taken care of [meaning
that all the issues presented in the January meeting were resolved at the time of
13

termination] in Mr Peterson's own testimony and handwriting
He [referring to Mr Peterson] had indicated on that exhibit, [referring to Mr
Peterson's list of reasons why Appellee's employment should be terminated, which Mr
Peterson presented Appellee at their last meeting] and I don't know which one specifically,
taken care of, not an issue, so what does that leave? It leaves then,
ostensibily, the telephone call to Sharon Mellen at work.
Well, what is that related to? The reason for the telephone call to Sharon Mellen at
work was the concern the Plaintiff [Appellee] had for the possible violation of Muriel
Mellen's right to know that she had that money, that she had the $720 00 " (Trial court oral
decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1236, emphasis added)
A few lines later in it's oral decision, the trial court again refers to the phone call stating,
"

the Plaintiff [Appellee] may have very well jumped the gun, maybe should have talked to

other people who were more conversant with the Mellen file, maybe should not have even called
Ms Mellen at work " (Trial court Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1237)
Finally, the trial court indicates it's understanding that the phone call was the cause of the
termination stating that, "if in fact, she was fired for the phone call, if, in fact, she was fired for
the looking out for resident's rights, I agree with Mr Peterson, that shouldn't be done here That's
exactly what happened here " (Trial court's Oral Decision, Tr Vol 5 at pp 1239)
In the instant case, the trial court found that Fairview terminated Appellee as punishment
for making a call to Sharon Mellen, which the trial court erroneously believed was conduct
furthering a public policy (R 00001236, R 0001239) Even if a "clear and substantial" public
policy did exist that would require immediate notification to a resident of funds received,
14

Appellee's conduct in calling Sharon Mellen, at her place of work, is not the type of conduct that
our Supreme Court has been willing to recognize as furthering such a policy Fox v MCI
Communications Corp . 931 P 2d 857 (Utah 1997) While public policy may require nursing
home employees to report suspected exploitation of residents to the proper authorities, that is not
what Appellee did in this case, and this was not the cause of her termination She was fired for
the irresponsible and unprofessional act of confronting a resident's family member at their place of
work about suspected misconduct by that person
Appellee has not shown the court that any specific duty existed in law which would
require a nursing home employee to confront resident's family members whenever that employee
suspects wrongdoing Fairview has made an exhaustive search and has found that no statute or
constitutional provision places such a duty or public obligation upon nursing home employees
Appellee's actions in this matter were therefore not "conduct furthering" a public policy of the
State of Utah and her termination is not actionable
While Appellee may have been treated punitively by Fairview, her punishment was not for
conduct furthering a "clear and substantial public policy" but instead for inappropriate and
unprofessional conduct, which needlessly caused upset to a family member of a resident The trial
court's determination to the contrary was incorrect and should be reversed
VII.

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL IS NO BAR TO FAIRVIEW'S CLAIM.
Appellee argues that Fairview is judicially estopped from arguing on appeal that Fairview's

termination of Appellee is completely unrelated to any public policy concerns because Fairview
did not violate any laws in their handling of Muriel Mellen's money (Appellee's brief at pp 36
and 37) In support of this argument, Appellee cites to Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank
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v Mehr. 791 P 2d 217, 22 (Utah App 1990) which states the following
Generally in legal proceedings a party with knowledge of all the facts will not be
allowed to take a position to fruition, and later, with no substantial change in
circumstances, return to attack the validity of the prior position or the outcome
flowing from it see, 28 Am Jur 2d Estoppel & Waiver §§68-70 (1966)
Appellee also cites to Hill v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co . 829 p 2d 142, 148, n 4
(Utah App 1992) which states the following
A doctrine which seeks to prevent a party in legal proceedings from taking a
position, pursuing that position to fruition, and later returning to attack the validity
of the prior position or the outcome flowing from it Condasv Condas. 618 P 2d
491, 496 *Utah 1980), Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v Mehr. 791
P 2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct App 1990) The purposes underlying the doctrine include
avoiding inconsistency, duplicity and waste of time Seattle First Natl Bank v
Marshall, 31 Wash App 339, 641 P 2d 1194, 1197 (1982)
Appellee's argument, however, overlooks a few crucial points in making this assertion First,
Fairview neither at the trial court nor in Appellant's brief has taken the position that a violation of
law is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of a public policy violation (Appellant's brief at pp
13) Although Appellant believes that such a determination by this Court would be appropriate,
Appellant acknowledges that the law in this area is not completely developed and it is as yet
uncertain whether the courts will require a violation of law before finding that a "clear and
substantial public policy" exists Fairview mentions the fact that they did not violate any laws as
additional support and credence to their main position that there was no clear and substantial
policy that required them to treat Muriel Mellen's check any differently than they had Fairview's
position is that one obviously recognizable way that the State's legislature may create the public
awareness of a clear and substantial policy is by creating laws which regulate the specific action
and set forth clear and recognizable punishment for violation of that law That puts the public as a
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whole on notice that they should not violate that law or take action in a contradictory stance to it
The elected officials are given the ability to create restrictions on behavior which are recognizably
clear to the citizens Having no current legislation in this area as testified to by the State's
Manager of the Health Program from the Department of Health Bureau of Medicare-Medicaid,
Program Certification and Resident Assessment, and mentioned earlier in this brief, Fairview
simply attempts to show the court that this is a clear sign that Appellee's termination was not
improper or otherwise a violation of any public policy
Second, the precedent cited regarding judicial estoppel does not support Appellee's
position, and, therefore, is fatally flawed Appellee's own case law, as quoted in Appellee's brief
and copied above, indicates that judicial estoppel prohibits a party from pursuing a "position to
fruition, and later with no substantial change in circumstances, returning] to attack the validity of
the prior position " (Appellee's brief at pp 36 and 37) Hill v State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
C o . 829 P 2d 142, 148, n 4 (Utah App 1992) Condasv Condas. 618 P 2d 491, 496 (Utah
1980) Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v Mehr. 791 P 2d 217, 220 (Utah App 1990)
Appellant, by definition, did not take any position to "fruition" as Appellee alleges
HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY

RANDOM

537 (1995), defines the term "fruition" as "1. attainment

of anything desired, realization, accomplishment to bring an idea to fruition 2. enjoyment, as of
something attained or realized 3. the state of bearing fruit" Here, Appellant has not been
attained, realized, or otherwise enjoyed any relief in regards to the outcome of this action in the
trial Court Appellee argues that Condasv Condas. 618 P 2d 491, 496 (Utah 1980), should apply
to the instant case Condas does apply and Condas illustrates that judicial estoppel is no bar to
Fairview's argument on appeal Condas states that "a party who has taken a position in prior
17

litigation and has obtained relief on the basis of it cannot maintain the opposite position in
another action." (Emphasis added) Id First, the litigation which Appellee alludes to as being
"prior litigation" is the same case which is currently up on appeal. Appellee inappropriately
attempts to make this case seem as though it were two separate and individual cases, when it is
simply and obviously the same case. Second, Appellant has never obtained relief from a prior
litigation—even in this same case, as Appellee tries to aruge—which would estop them from taking
an opposing position in a new litigation as Condas v. Condas regulates. There was no "fruition"
for the Appellant. No relief was obtained. Accordingly, the law of judicial estoppel does not
apply to the current case in regards to what Appellant has argued on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Fairview is respectfully requesting that this Court reverse the
decision of the trial Court.
DATED THIS ^ H f a y of ~ 1 ^ *

, 1998.
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